Introduction
Already today, in our own time, man has ceased to face his outer world supportcd only by his unaided intellect; already today man faces this world as one who has entered into a symbiotic relation with his own most fantastic creation, his digital computer. 1 recall only too c1early how, when 1 predicted that something like this would happen some twenty years ago, my audience tittered with cmbarrassment; today, however, such a statement has become commonplace, if not actually platitudinous.
A digital computer is a device for processing information, and most of us already live in societies where the processing of information is the principal social occupation, employing directly more persons than any of agriculture, trade, or manufacturing. Just as we have in earlier times identified agricultural, mercantile and industrial societies by the preponderant role of a particular type of employmcnt in them, so most of us today indentify our current society as an informotionol society. Similarly, just as each of these types of society can be said to have been established by a revolution (and we may here think especially of thc industriol revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries), so we nowadays speak of an ù1!ormotionol revolution, as that which establishes an informational society. Once again, and again quite consentaneously, just as we associate one of our most significant agricultural revolutions with deep ploughing, using an iron plough, our most significant mercantile revolution with the magnetic compass and the chronometer, and our culminating industrial revolution with the steam engine, so we associa te our current informational revolution with the digital machine.
This symbiosis of man and digital machine nowadays extends to every aspect of human activity, so that it also extends to our own area of hydraulics. The hydraulician, he also, enters into a symbiotic relation with the digital machine, and it is in this symbiotic relation that he, in his turn, relates to society as a whole. A long time ago now, in 1969, 1 introduced the name of Computotionol Hydroulies to coyer the symbiosis between hydraulics and digital computing, while 1 have more recently, in 1987, introduced the na me of Hydroinformoties to coyer the symbiosis between the hydraulician and information technology generally, as this relates in its turn to society as a whole (Abbott, 1979; Abbott, J99üd) . Thus computational hydraulics is the science of the hydraulics of an informational society, while hydroinformatics is the technology of applying computational hydraulics within society.
(However whereas «computational hydraulics)} has never translated at ail weil into French and German, « hydroinformatics )} has done so from the very beginning -as « hydroinformatique )} and « hydroinformatik )} -; so perhaps 1 am at least making some progress in this business of coining new names !)
About hydroinformatics
In Abbott (1990d) , the definition of hydroinformatics is advanced through four stages. The first of these, which is based primarily upon Heidegger's (1977) The other two definitions will be introduced when conciuding this piece. The principal immediate and pragmatic aspect is that hydroinformatics comprehends ail applications of information technology to the aquatic environment. It is thus concerned with measuring and recording devices, including remote-sensing facilities, with data and knowledge structuring, coding and transmission, with a variety of kinds of buffer memory devices, with domain knowledge encapsulation (legal, contractual, hydraulic, hydrologic, quality parametric, etc...) in models, both of the logical and numerical varieties, with man-machine interfaces and other graphics facilities, and indeed every thing else of this kind. It is by no means restricted to simulations, but extends through the provision of adviceserving facilities to on-line control, safety, planning and maintenance systems. Its development is based on the premise that the engineer of the year 2000 will be a tool user on a very large scale. (It is estimated that in the year-2000 European-market-competitive environment, at least 100000 ECU of tooling will be required for each engineer: see, for example, Abbott et al., 1991.) Moreover, engineering and other applied-science needs will necessitate a movement beyond the level of specific, stand-alone tools, to the provision of languages providing tool interaction, and thence the provision of complete working environments (Abbott, 1990a, b, c and d) .
Hydroinformatics thus brings together both deducing and computing aspects of digital machine utilisation. Indeed, from a narrow, scientific-content point of view, hydroinformatics is composed by the union of artificial intelligence (AI) and computational hydraulics (CH). It follows, by way of example, that its mathematics must have a bias towards the study of recursion, whether this takes the forms of foreward and backward chaining in the inference engine of an expert system shell or it takes the form offoreward, backward and doubles-weep algorithmic structures in numerical modelling. As the general approach represented by this aspect of recursion is already weil established in mathematical logic (e.g. Lightstone, 1978; Lyndon, 1964; Mendelson, 1964 ; Manin, 1977) , while the way between this basis and AI has been set out by Genesereth and Nilsson (1988) and the way between it and computational hydraulics by Abbott and Basco (1989) , it is clear at once that mathematical logic provides, together with its consort of set theory, the fundamental mathematical basis of the science of hydroinformatics.
Mathematical foundations
Modern science, as Heidegger in particular explained, is mathematical through and through, even when it is not cast explicitly in mathematical form. Correspondingly, few engineers are aware that they are using mathematics at every stage of their careers, even though they are not « writing equations». But then, given that mathematical education in engineering generally lags about one hundred years behind the research upon which it is based, it is quite easy to predict the mathematical-educational requirements of the hydraulic engineer of the year 2000 simply by referring back to the state of mathematical research in the year 1900. This makes our task particularly simple, since at the International Congress of Mathematicians held in Paris in 1900, David Hilbert presented, on the 8th August, 23 problems which he believed would occupy mathematicians throughout the entire 20th century. A survey made in 1975 (Browder, 1976) demonstrated that Hilbert's estimate was correct in the case of mathematics per se, even as the perception of the nature of these problems appeared to have changed as the century progressed. However, over the period , sorne of these Hilbert problems have also come to influence technologies like hydraulics. It must suffice here to mention only the influences on hydraulics of the second of these Hilbert problems, but then in a little detail. Let us first state what this problem is.
Hilbert's second problem has to do nominally with the consistency of the axioms of arithmetic. Kreisel (1976) stated it in the form of a proposition:
« It should be possible to exploit the finiteness of (al/) proofs and so establish the consistency of the axioms of arithmetic without the use of (familiar) infinite models,. even though the theorems proved are ordinari/y intended to be about infinite sets. » The attempt to realise this supposition, to demonstrate its general validity, came to be calied « Hilbert's programme». It was the intention to demonstrate that the whole realm of mathematics couId be constructed from out of a finite set of formai axioms using only finite sets of formallogical operations. In particular, it should by these means be deducible, or decidable, whether any given theorem was true or false. Correspondingly, in time, Hilbert's programme came to devolve upon the problem of establishing this possibility, so that it became a « problem of decidability», or Entscheidungsproblem. As in mathematical logic every problem of deducibility is mirrored by a problem of computibility (e.g. Manin, 1977) , the El1Ischei-dungsproblem could also be posed in terms of demonstrating the computability of any « function », i.e. the existence of an algorithm for solving any given problem.
As is now rather widely known, Hilbert's programme was shown to be untcnable, at least in its most general form, already by Godel, in 1931. Il suffices to recall here that in the proof of the first of the two theorems enunciated by Godel at that time (see van Heijenoort, 1967, pp. 592-617) , it was demonstrated that within any consistent system of logic or mathematics generally that was rich enough to encompass arithmetic, statements could be made that could be neither proved nor disproved. Such statements could only be proved or disproved within a system that was richer in its axioms ; but then within this system again statements could be found that could be neither proved nor disproved. Thus, as Heppenheimer (1990) has expressed the matter: « Godel's work demonstrated limits to the ability of mathematics to answer questions in its own fields. » Now from one point of view -which was for a long time the dominant point of view in mathematical logicGodel's 1931 theorems concluded an epoch, which van Heijenoort characterised in one of « the arithmetisation of logic ». However, a central issue during this process of arithmetisation was that of the possibility of constructing and solving of logical polynomials which had solutions exclusively in the field of integral numbers. These are the so-called « diophantine equations ». (This issue was posed independently as the tenth problem of Hilbert's 1900 list.) It was in fact shown by Matyasevich in 1970 (see Chai tin, 1987, and Heppenheimer, 1990 ) that there is no general procedure cven for establishing the existence of solutions of such equations: any theory of diophantine equations will entail formally undecidable examples.
Perhaps better known nowadays is the posing of this problem in terms of an idealised computer known as a « Turing machine ». We may in this case recall Turing's question of whether one could decide whether, for any arbitrary programme, this machine would run on indefinitely or come to a hait. Turing showed that this question is also undecidable : no general method can exist for determining whether any programme whatsoever will hait.
These problems, of diophantine analysis and general algorithmic halting, came together in a series of pa pers by Chaitin (e.g. 1982 Chaitin (e.g. , 1987 . In summing-up this work, Chaitin wrote (1987) :
«
/n conclusion, we have seen that proving whether parliculaI' exponential diophal1line equations have finitely or infinite/y many solutions, is absolutely intractable. Such questions escape the power of mathematical reasoning. This is a region in which mathematical truth has no discernible structure or pattern and appears to be completely random. These questions are completely beyond the power of human reasoning. Mathematics cannot deal with them. »
We might then observe, in passing, that this same conclusion appears to arise in the case of turbulent flows : the problem of determining the flow obtaining in the limit, as f1x j~O ,i = 1,2,3, and f1t~0 appears also to be and undecidable problem (e.g. Abbott and Basco, 1989, p.366) .
The number myth
As we run out of the limits of the scientific, so we run into the realm of the mythical. This has been realised long aga in the area of quantum physics, and indeed Chai tin, Heppenheimer and other mathematicians have often drawn upon this earlier realisation. Thus, from the quantum-physical side, we may quote Finkelstein (1978, p. 99 As 1 have discussed the number myth as this arises in computational hydraulics and hydroinformatics at length elsewhere (Abbott, 1989; Abbott and Basco, 1989; Abbott, 1990d) , it must suffice here only to reiterate two of its aspects or manifestations. The first of these is that of numerical instability where, as described in Abbott and Basco (1989, p. 70 et seq) : «Instability is the numbers' way of telling us that our scheme contains contradictory statements. »
In the real world of num~rical modelling it is this principIe that sustains us in the greater part of our work, as we proceed to develop our models, and with these our modelling systems, by driving them to instability and then investigating the conceptual contradictions that trigger these instabilities. As explained more fully in Abbott (1990b) , a statement of principle such as this is not a scientific statement : it can be neither demonstrated for ail schemes nor proven from more immediate, or self-evident propositions. It is a statement borne of experience, through constant reiteration, so that it is a dogmatic statement, that is, a statement of a myth. It is conjectured, here and now, that the question of its general truth or falsity is undecidable.
In the same vein, the paradoxes that arise in computational hydraulics -to date: the stability paradox, the resolution paradox of weak solutions and the circulation paradox -are manifestations of the number myth. They serve as further metaphores for this myth.
The manifestations of the number myth cannot be restricted to the side of computability, however. We may also, as our second illustration, see their manifestations within studies of the limitations of symbolic paradigms in AI, and particularly in the formulation and justification of subsymbolic paradigms, such as those currently realised using neural network machines and their emulators. The questions of the potentials and limitations of the respective paradigms can be reduced to (or« modelled » by) arithmetic questions, so that they also fall within the ambit of the number myth. This is also introduced in Abbott (1 990d). The teleological question then arises quite generally of the ultimate purposes and aims of numerical modelling and logical modelling as the primary outer-world manifestations of productions of the number myth in our own times. As has there been argued (much along the Iines of Jaspers and Bultmann, 1954) , this myth, like ail other myths, must be connected to the totality and unity of myths of theistic allegory. In my work 1 have connected this aim to what is currently called the « environmental » one, of protecting the natural, aquatic environment, the Leonardian «arte-ries and veins » of the biosphere, a.nd in this 1 have followed Barth (1960) . In general terms, the answer to the « teleological » question concerning modelling» provides the third definition of hydroinformatics, as follows (Abbott, I990d) : «Hydroinformatics is the coming to presence of the number myth as this supports us in our stewardship of the arteries and veins of the biosphere». Then, in the more specifie vocabulary of a (Barthian) Christian theology, this becomes, as a fourth definition : «Hydroinformatics is the means whereby the number myth strengthens the covenant between the Creator and His creature in the realms of the arteries and veins of the biosphere ».
Conclusions
Although the hydraulic engineer of the year 2000 may be relieved from many routine design and management tasks by advances in tools, languages and environments, this engineer will require a much deeper understanding of certain fundamental matters in order to make proper use of these facilities. In particular, a rather thorough grounding in mathematicallogic and set theory will be required, probably with the emphasis upon the mathematical-Iogical side. These are, for example, foundational subjects in the International Course on Hydroinformatics, which is due to begin in Delft in October 1991. In view of what has been said above, it should be explained that it is not intended in the Delft course to teach diophantine analysis, while the discussions of undecidability will be restricted to those arising from the Turing problem. The symbolic paradigm side will be advanced roughly along the Iines already set out by Genesereth and Nilsson (1988) . The mathematicallogical distinctions between (first-and second-order) languages will similarly be used to initiate the computational-f1uid-dynamic side, as set out by Abbott and Basco (1989) . The limitations of both approaches in ecological modelling, including its anthropological aspects, will then be associated with limitations arising from the more fundamental assumptions, leading to the use of sybsymbolic paradigms, as introduced in Abbott (1990d).
Over and above ail these matters, however, the engineer of the year 2000 will need sorne guidance and advice on the subject of mythology. The nature of mythology needs to be explained: its inevitability in ail thinking about society and science, and indeed in thought generally, its forms or metaphores, its connections, teleologies and aeschatologies, its hermeneutics and its various exegeses; ail of this needs to be ·introduced. The results of such as Dilthey, Husserl, Heidegger and Jaspers on the metaphysical side, and of such as Schleiermacher, Barth and Bultmann (with apologies for the Protestant bias !) on the other side (see Abbott, 1990d) need to be communicated. We dare not leave our young engineers as helpless « babes in the woods» when it cornes to such critical and potentially dangerous matters as these. With such an understanding in place, on the other hand, the relation between man and his most fantastic creation, his digital machine, can transform from one of symbiosis to one of synergy. This is, of course, a necessary condition for facing the environmental challenges of the next century, and so for redressing the balance between the forces on the side of the creation and those opposing the creation, in the realms of the arteries and veins of the biosphere. It is really such a long way from the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées, where these things are not currently taught, to the Ecole Normale Supérieure, where they presumably are (e.g. Derrida, 1982) ?
